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THE MENTAL ELEMENT AS A LIMITATION ON
THE LAW OF TREASON
BY JOEL W. WESTBROOK*
On January 14, 1861, Judge Smalley charged a grand jury called for
the Southern District of New York.
The court has requested your attendance this morning; in order to
call your attention to, and give you some instructions in relation to,
crimes which have long been unknown in our hitherto peaceful and
happy country, which for more than 50 years the federal courts have
not been called upon to investigate, and which are, therefore, very
imperfectly understood in the community.1
In the hundred-odd years since that grand jury met there have been
comparatively few treason prosecutions ;2 yet, there has been, especially in
recent years, widespread public interest in treason, and there have been many
investigations by federal investigative agencies, by congressional committees,
and by individual members of Congress. Compared with other felonies, how-
ever, treason as a crime has still taken little of the energy and time of our
federal courts.
3
Although it would seem that treason as a crime is still "imperfectly under-
stood in the community," it is likewise probably true that treason as a legal
concept is still imperfectly understood even in the profession charged with
prosecuting, defending, and supervising treason trials. Clearly, one reason
for this situation is that the legal profession has not had sufficient study
material on the subject in the reported cases due to the relatively few oppor-
tunities for judicial interpretation as compared with the numerous occasions
for judicial analyses of other areas of criminal behavior. The possibility should
also be considered that some of the more significant of these few judicial
opinions may have in fact complicated understanding.
* B.A., 1940, University of Texas; LL.B., 1940, University of Texas; partner, Jones,
Boyd, Westbrook & Lovelace, Waco, Texas.
1. Charge to Grand Jury-Treason, 30 Fed. Cas. 1032, 1033 (No. 18,270) (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1861).
2. As of December 1944 there had been "less than two score treason prosecutions
pressed to trial by the Federal Government . . . ." Hurst, Treason in the United States
111, 58 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1945). Subsequently, there were a few additional prosecutions.
Infra note 110.
3. Still less so of state courts. But see State v. Taylor, 194 Miss. 1, 11 So. 2d 663,
rev'd, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
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The question also arises: why so few American treason prosecutions?
Could it be because we have had so few traitors in American history? Cer-
tainly, if the term "traitor" be given its ordinary usage,4 the contrary would
appear, for traitors surely have been numerous with us, however sparing
our formal prosecutions of treason. We should not forget that these United
States derived their very nationhood from a flagrantly treasonous challenge
to our then sovereign lord, George III. 5 Nor do we forget that General
Benedict Arnold achieved the most distinguished infamy by the high places
he alternately occupied in his own shifting allegiances. The spirit of adventure
and zeal for profit no doubt inspired such early nineteenth century enterprises
as those that brought accusations of treason against such as Phillip Nolan,
Aaron Burr, and General James Wilkinson. Many Americans in the Repub-
lic's early days challenged the new sovereignty under circumstances many
considered treasonable. 6 Then, the convulsions of the mid-nineteenth century
produced a bitter levy of war by the millions in the Southern States who owed
their legal allegiance to the United States; for these unsuccessful millions
there were Radical Republicans and many others to cry them traitors. (At the
same time within the body of the Union itself there were persons such as
Clement Vallandigham, leader of the Copperhead opposition to the prosecu-
tion of the Union's war effort and fast friend of the Confederacy.) Although
there resulted from the First World War not a single complete prosecution
under the treason statute,7 there were numerous American citizens aiding
Imperial Germany, some of whom were convicted of espionage. During and
after World War II the treason tempo increased with the respective bold
thrusts of international subversion of the Fascists and the Communists. The
Korean Conflict produced a new phenomenon, the wholesale collaboration by
American soldiers with their Chinese Communist captors. As for our "peace-
time" years, even discounting the shocking looseness with which some have
employed the treason concept,8 there can be little doubt that our society's
integrity has for some while been under persistent subversive attack.9
4. "One who betrays a confidence or trust; one who acts perfidiously or treacherously
.... .WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1960).
5. Of course, our national literature has honored the observation: "Treason can
never prosper-What's the reason? If it does prosper, none dare call it treason."-John
Harrington's "Alcilia."
6. E.g., Shay's Rebellion against Massachusetts and the Whiskey Insurrection in
western Pennsylvania against enforcement of the federal excise taxes on spirits.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1958).
8. In 1951, for example, it was charged that the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense were engaged in a conspiracy to "weaken the United States for its conquest
by the Soviet Union." New York Times, June 15, 1951, p. 3, col. 3.
9. In his Foreword to HOOVER, MASTERS OF DECEIT (1958), J. Edgar Hoover states
that communism today "threatens the very existence of our Western civilization." Id.
at vi.
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Surely we consider treason as odious today as it has always been con-
sidered, although we no longer punish prisoners as brutally as was once the
the case in England, for example, where the convicted traitor was dragged
behind a horse over rough ground to the gallows, hanged, cut down just
before death, disemboweled, partially burned, and then quartered and ex-
hibited. 10 In America there undoubtedly would be general agreement with
Rebecca West who, in her fascinating lay study of the World War II treason
trials in England, characterized treason as "that sin which is the dark travesty
of legitimate hatred because it is felt for kindred just as incest is the dark
travesty of legitimate love."" The American judiciary has unquestionably
concurred in the severe view: "Treason is the most serious offense that may
be committed against the United States . . . and its gravity is emphasized
by the fact that it is the only crime defined by the Constitution."'1 2 Thus,
neither a scarcity of traitors nor public condonation of treason would appear
to explain why there have been so few prosecutions under the American
treason statute. 13 This Article suggests that judicial treatment of the mental
element of treason has made prosecutions under the constitutionally-phrased
federal treason statute so difficult that sanctions have been sought under
other criminal statutes such as the Espionage Act,14 the Smith Act, 1' and
the Seditious Conspiracy Act.' 6 Willard Hurst, in his monumental three-part
article on treason declared that "the majority opinion in Cramer v. United
States has cast such a net of ambiguous limitations about the crime of 'treason'
that it is doubtful whether a careful prosecutor will ever again chance an
indictment under that head."' 7 Resort to these other criminal sanctions
creates difficult legal problems, all substantially centered around the mental
element.' 8 The role of the mental element, or mens rea, in the law of treason
differs radically from its role in the "ordinary law of crimes" where the act
is the "vital thing whenever it is done with a criminal intent" 19 and where
10. Simon, The Evolution of Treason, 35 TUL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1961). Also,
treason was the only crime for which "benefit of clergy" was not permitted. Id. at 686.
11. WEST,. THE MEANING OF TREASON 3 (1947).
12. Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 781
(1943) (death penalty treason case for concealing and aiding in the escape of a German
prisoner of war during World War II).
13. A partial explanation was suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson in Cramer v. United
States, 325 U.S. 1 (1944) when he said, "We have managed to do without treason
prosecutions to a degree that probably would be impossible except while a people was
singularly confident of external security and internal stability." Id. at 26.
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-99, 2388 (1958).
15. Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (now 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958)).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (1958).
17. Hurst, supra note 2, at 845.
18. See United States v. Hoxie, 26 Fed. Cas. 397, 399-400 (No. 15,407) (C.C.D.
Vt. 1808).




the essential principle requires that a crime cannot be postulated upon the
mental attitude alone.
20
Before the American constitutional provision defining the crime of
treason, 21 the law had incriminated virtually upon treasonable thoughts alone.
22
Augustus Caesar in his Lex Julia Majestatis proclaimed:
He who shall meditate the death of any of those illustrious men
who assist at our councils; likewise of the senators (for they are a
part of ourselves) or lastly of any of our companions in arms; shall
for as much as he is guilty of treason, perish by the sword, and all
his goods be confiscated; for the law shall punish the intention and
the perpetration of the crime with equal severity.
2 3
Our English forebears, to whom we have been accustomed to look for due
process of law, so expanded their central concept of treason-to compass
the king's death24-by judicial interpretation that it virtually embraced the
whole field of criminal law. 25 This expanded concept became known in
England as "constructive treason," condemned by Thomas Jefferson as "that
deadly weapon . . . which had drawn the blood of the best and honestest men
in the kingdom."'26 At one time it was even considered as "quasi treason"
to fail to attend Anglican services and render ecclesiastical homage, 27 and for
the brief period of one year it was made treason to repeal the then new law
of treasons.
28
Our own American constitutional definition of treason "has left no room
for constructive treason.129 Article III, section 3 of the United States Con-
stitution reads as follows:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession
in open Court.
The drafters of the Constitution substantially restricted the ambit of treason
prosecutions when they limited treason prosecutions to only two categories of
conduct, "levying War," and "adhering to the Enemies" of the United States.
20. CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES § 4.00, at 176-77 (6th ed. 1958).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
22. See Note, Historical Concept of Treason: English, American, 35 Iin. L.J. 70,
72-73 (1959).
23. Emphasis added.
24. The Treason Act, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2.
25. Supra note 22, at 70.
26. 1 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 215 (Library ed. 1903).
27. Simon, snpra note 10, at 694.
28. 21 Rich. 2, c. 3 (1398) ; 1 Hen. 4, c. 37 (1399).
29. Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
781 (1943).
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The two categories must be examined separately because the setting and
the state of mind pertinent to each are quite different.
LEVYING WAR
"[L]evying War" typically has occurred in peacetime and has taken on
the quality of a domestic insurrection; however, "adhering to the Enemies"
requires the background of a state of open hostility with a foreign power. 30
Prosecutions for "levying War" tended to group around the early days of the
Republic, when citizens were unused to the new federal power and restive
under it, with the exception of a few cases, most of which were connected
with our Civil War.
In the year 1795 vigorous, armed, and concerted opposition to the federal
excise tax on whiskey developed in western Pennsylvania. Excise officers
had their official papers seized and were forced to take an oath that they
would no longer undertake to collect the tax. Two of the treason cases which
resulted were United States v. Mitchell,1 and United States v. Vigol.
32
Mr. Justice Patterson, sitting as Circuit Justice in both cases, charged the
jury that the crime of treason by levying war would be committed if the
defendants had as their object the suppression of the excise officers and the
prevention of execution of the act of Congress by force and intimidation.
Patterson said that treason by levying war was a crime of a general nature
and of national concern; he pointed out in the Mitchell case that an attack
on the house of General Neville was not an act of private revenge, but was
directed at the General because of his role in the collection of the excise tax.33
Four years later in United States v. Fries,3 4 Mr. Justice Iredell, sitting
as Circuit Justice, charged the grand jury with respect to charges concerning
the insurrection in northeastern Pennsylvania against the enforcement of
the federal house tax.3 5 The basis for the tax was the measurement and-
registration of the number of windows of private houses. The tax was strongly
resisted. President John Adams issued a proclamation calling for enforce-
ment of the act and called out the Pennsylvania militia. After a long dis-
quisition on the alien and sedition laws Mr. Justice Iredell stated:
[I]f... the intention was to prevent by force of arms the execution
of any act of the congress of the United States altogether . . . any
forcible opposition calculated to carry that intention into effect, was
a levying of war against the United States, and of course an act
30. United States v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. Cas. 18 (No. 15,254) (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863).
31. 26 Fed. Cas. 1277 (No. 15,788) (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
32. 28 Fed. Cas. 376 (No. 16,621) (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
33. 26 Fed. Cas. at 1281.
34. 9 Fed. Gas. 826 (No. 5,126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799).
35. Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 70, 1 Stat. 580.
1963]
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of treason. But if the intention was merely to defeat its operation in
a particular instance, or through the agency of a particular officer,
from some private or personal motive, though a higher offense may
have been committed, it did not amount to the crime of treason.3 6
Fries, with others, was indicted, the indictment alleging, inter alia, that they
rescued prisoners from the United States marshal, took official papers from
the tax assessors, and warned the tax assessors against the execution of their
assessments. At the trial Iredell also charged the petit jury in accordance with
the western Pennsylvania insurrection decisions. Fries was found guilty but
was given a new trial because of the uncovered prejudice of one of the jurors.
The western Pennsylvania insurrection decisions were again followed in the
charge to the jury during Fries' second trial at which Mr. Justice Chase was
presiding as Circuit Justice.
37
Nine years later the opportunity arose in United States v. Hoxie38 for
a defendant accused of treason to be acquitted if the jury could find that his
interference with the execution of a federal law was for a private rather than
a public purpose. 39 Hoxie was indicted as one of several who were hired to
recapture a barge, which had been seized by federal customs authorities as
it was being smuggled into Canada. The armed band succeeded in recapturing
the barge and fired upon the troops guarding it although no one was hurt on
either side. Mr. Justice Livingston, sitting as Circuit Justice, in charging
the jury, told them that "when the object of an insurrection is of local or
private nature, not having a direct tendency to destroy all property and all
government by armed force, it will not amount to treason .... ,,40 While com-
menting on the facts of the case, Livingston said:
[T]he offense laid, stripped of its artificial dress, and technical
appearance, is nothing more than the forcible rescuing of a raft from
the custody of a military guard placed over it by a collector. It is
impossible, to suppress the astonishment which is excited at the at-
tempt which has been made to convince a court and jury of this high
criminal jurisdiction, that, between this and levying of war, there is
no difference.
41
The court distinguished the Mitchell, Vigol, and Fries cases as insurrections
threatening the existence of the Government and actually causing the temporary
suspension of the operation of certain laws. 42 Also, the court noted the con-
36. 9 Fed. Cas. at 840.
37. United States v. Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 924 (No. 5,127) (C.C.D. Pa. 1800). Fries was
again convicted but was later pardoned by the President.
38. 26 Fed. Cas. 397 (No. 15,407) (C.C.D. Vt. 1808).
39. Id. at 399.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Id. at 400.
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tention of the prosecution that opposing the enforcement of a law was treason,
irrespective of motive, but Mr. Justice Livingston disagreed with this con-
tention.
43
As a result of the early treason cases and of the Hoxie case in particular,
a basis developed for the contention that a defendant's motive is decisive in
determining whether or not he is guilty of treason. The general rule in
criminal law is that "neither failure to prove motive nor proof of a good
motive will prevent a conviction" ;44 yet, the question of motive, as distin-
guished from intent, has arisen again and again in American treason trials.
The latest direct federal court expressions on the subject were in Chandler
v. United States45 and Best v. United States46 which held that the fact that
the defendant's motive might not have been to aid the enemy was no defense.
The exculpatory "private purpose" doctrine of the early cases was re-
affirmed in the case of United States v. Hanway.47 Hanway was charged with
treason for participating in resistance to the execution of the Fugitive Slave
Law.48 Pursuant to warrants obtained under this law a Maryland slave
owner named Gorsuch, a deputy United States marshal, and others under-
took to apprehend and return two fugitive slaves belonging to Gorsuch. They
were resisted by a large number of armed Negroes, and Hanway, a white
resident of the neighborhood, appeared with this assembly and refused the
marshal's request for help. It is said that "possibly" the defendant Hanway
may have encouraged the armed assembly, which killed Gorsuch and wounded
others.
49
Mr. Justice Grier sat at the trial as Circuit Justice and charged the
jury that the participants in the assembly were clearly guilty of riot and
murder, but that the jury would have to decide whether or not the defendant
Hanway was guilty of the offense with which he was charged, treason. This
determination, Grier charged, involved the issue of whether or not Hanway
aided and abetted the assembly and the further issue of whether or not the
asseml)lage's behavior amounted to treason. Justice Grier concluded that the
better view of the English cases was that the term "levying war" should be
confined to insurrections and rebellions for the purpose of overturning the
Government by force in arms50 and "to effect something of a public nature,
to overthrow the government, or to nullify some law of the United States,
43. Id. at 402.
44. CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 20, § 5.00, at 234.
45. 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1948).
46. 184 F.2d 131 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1950).
47. 26 Fed. Cas. 105 (No. 15,299) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851).
48. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
49. 26 Fed. Cas. at 106.
50. Id. at 127.
19631
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and totally to hinder its execution, or compel its repeal." 51 He compared the
actions of Hanway with the actions of smugglers operating for private gain
or debtors resisting a levy upon their property as a matter of private grievance
and characterized the behavior of the smugglers and debtors as nontreason-
able. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Grier stated that he himself did not believe
that the defendant's acts constituted treason,52 although he said he was leaving
the question to the jury. The jury found him not guilty.
In the same year of 1851 a mob in Boston "rescued" a fugitive slave
who had been taken by federal officers before a United States commissioner
for examination. Judge Sprague charged his grand jury in this case5" in
accord with the Mitchell, Vigol, Fries, and Hanway cases, but he elaborated
so as to provide perhaps an even narrower scope of treason by levying war
through his following reference to purpose:
But the sudden outbreak of a mob, or the assembling of men in order
by force to defeat the execution of the law, in a particular instance,
and then to disperse, without the intention to continue together, or
to re-assemble for the purpose of defeating the law generally, in all
cases, is not levying war.
5 4
ADHERING TO THE ENEMIES
Motive was also given a significant place in the early "adhering to the
Enemies" cases. The defendant in United States v. Pryor55 was charged
(1) with carrying provisions to a British naval squadron and (2) with going
from the squadron to the Delaware shore with the intent of procuring provi-
sions for the blockading squadron. The evidence indicated that the defendant
had been captured by the British, together with his shipload of flour. He
then went ashore with a British flag of truce and armed British troops to get
provisions for the British as "ransom" for himself and his fellow prisoners.
Mr. Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting as Circuit Justice, told the jury
that motive would palliate the enormity of the offense if the act were treason.
5 6
He then said that there was no overt act, and, therefore, no treason because
the intention to supply the provisions was never carried out. 57 Washington
stated the case would be different if he actually had been carrying the provi-
sions toward the enemy and was stopped enroute; however, in such a case as
Pryor's, "the motives which induced the prisoner to use his exertions to
51. Id. at 128.
52. Id. at 129.
53. Charge to Grand Jury-Fugitive Slave Law, 30 Fed. Cas. 1015 (No. 18,263)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
54. Id. at 1015.
55. 27 Fed. Cas. 628 (No. 16,096) (C.C.D. Pa. 1814).
56. Id. at 630.
57. Ibid.
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procure provisions, would take from his conduct every possible imputation
of disloyalty and disaffection to his country.'"58 Washington then said that
if the intention of the prisoner was to procure provisions for the
enemy, by uniting with him in acts of hostility against the United
States, or its citizens, which is chiefly pressed against him by the
District Attorney; then, indeed, it must be admitted that his progress-
ing toward the shore, was an overt act of adhering to the enemy,
although no act of hostility was in fact committed. 59
It would appear that Washington in the final analysis could only have intended
to say that motive would be relevant to uncolor, so to speak, the character of
an overt act which on its face was treasonable.
About the same time as the Pryor case the very interesting case of
United States v. Hodges0 was decided. The defendant, an American civilian,
demanded and received- four British prisoners from an American military
guard, and he delivered them to the British military, who had threatened to
destroy the defendant's home town in default of this delivery of prisoners.
The reported case reflects eloquent and vigorous exchanges between William
Pinkney, the defendant's attorney, and Elias Glenn, the prosecutor. Glenn
asked the court to instruct the jury that the mere act of delivering the
prisoner was an overt act of high treason, and contended that there were only
two questions to be submitted to the jury: (1) Did the defendant deliver the
prisoners? (2) Did he intend to do so?
Pinkney, while arguing to the court the question of jury instructions,
stated that "in indictments for treason, the overt acts laid are to show the
manner in which the wicked intention is carried into execution." 61 He cited
Erskine in the case of Lord George Gordon, who was acquitted because it
was not proven, said Pinkney, that he was either the enemy of the king or
the friend of an enemy of the king. Pinkney compared his client's situation
to that of a man who delivered up a castle. He might, said Pinkney, be a
coward but not a traitor unless he did it with the purpose of benefiting the
enemy. Suppose, Pinkney pointed out, that the British invader were to levy
contributions and that the defendant complied with the levy. Pinkney insisted
he would not be a traitor because there would be no evidence of hostility to the
interest of the country.6 2 Pinkney cited the English Stone's Case63 where intel-
ligence was communicated to the enemy. He pointed out that in that case
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
60. 26 Fed. Cas. 332 (No. 15,374) (C.C.D. Md. 1815).
61. Id. at 333.
62. Ibid.
63. 1 East, P.C. 79.
1963]
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counsel was allowed to argue that his client's intent was to dissuade the enemy
from invasion.
My client is charged, as Stone was charged, with being an adherent;
and, like him, is entitled to be sheltered by his motives from the im-
putation of treason .... What is an adherent? Can he be anything
less than a willing partisan, a corrupt auxiliary of the enemy?64
Pinkney contended vigorously that any other construction would revive "the
ferocious and appalling doctrine of constructive treason, which once made
England bleed at every pore, and stained the palace and the cottage with
judicial murder.
'65
Mr. Justice Duval, sitting as Circuit Justice, briefly stated: (1) the overt
act laid sufficiently alleged treason; (2) if "the act itself amounts to treason
it involves the intention," and only a threat to the life of the defendant would
excuse the act; and (3) the jury was not bound by the court's opinion. 66
Judge Houston, sitting with Mr. Justice Duval, said he agreed only with
respect to the third proposition,6 7 which does not today represent the law in
federal courts or in most state jurisdictions. 68 Pinkney then very eloquently
argued to the jury both the law and the facts; and the jury, without hesitating
a moment, rendered a verdict of not guilty.
Thus, Mr. Justice Washington in Pryor and Mr. Justice Duval in
Hodges appear to have had conflicting views about the place of motive in
treason prosecutions, and the jury in both cases probably agreed that a good
motive should exculpate. Apparently Duval's view has not prevailed. Judge
Mayer in 1919 charged the jury in United States v. Fricke,9 that they should
acquit if the defendant's assistance to a German agent was for personal
reasons and not for the purpose of aiding the German government, or of
injuring the United States of America.
7 0
MOTIVE IN MODERN TREASON CASES
Although Justices Patterson, Iredell, Chase, Livingston, Grier, Wash-
ington, and Duval were members of the United States Supreme Court at the
time they were presiding at the early treason trials, it was not until Chandler
v. United States71 that a federal appellate court squarely resolved the ques-




68. Morris v. United States, 156 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1946) ; 53 AM. JUR. Trial § 278
(1945).
69. 259 Fed. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
70. Id. at 676.
71. 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1948).
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tion of whether or not "good" motive can exculpate in a treason prosecution. 72
The treason charge in Chandler involved the defendant's radio broadcasting
activities for Germany during World War II. The case dealt in large part
with the defendant's contention that mere words do not constitute treason. 7
There was also considerable attention given to the question of compliance
with the two-witnesses rule, and the court held, as in Haupt v. United States,
74
that two witnesses need not testify to the "same atomized element of the
course of conduct.
75
The court dealt at length with the question of intent to betray. 76 The
defendant contended that the trial court drew an erroneous distinction between
intent and motive in its jury charge in which the court told the jury: (1) that
every person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts, and
on that basis they would be warranted in finding the requisite intent; and (2)
that the fact that his motive might not have been to aid the enemy is no
defense. The court of appeals stated that "whether Chandler was 'sincere' in
what he did, whether he had the heart of a patriot, is a matter that may be
sifted out at the last Great Judgment Seat; but the law of treason is concerned
with matters more immediate. '77 The court also pointed out that there was
no problem of "enemy duress." There was a hint that a legal problem might
exist where an American citizen "caught in enemy country at the outbreak
of war, may, in order to earn a living without the stigma of treason, accept
employment which in these days of total war might conceivably be of some
aid in the enemy war effort."
78
Chandler would certainly appear to contradict Pryor. There is, of course,
a distinction in the types of motives: Chandler's, if it be believed, was of an
ultimate nature, it being his fanatic and "sincere" belief that his broadcasting
72. Earlier a federal district court in United States v. Werner, 247 Fed. 708 (E.D.
Pa. 1918), overruling a demurrer, stated:
It is conceivable that a defendant may have this condemned attitude of mind or
be what is termed "traitor at heart," and yet not expose himself to the charge of
legal treason because he has committed no traitorous act. It is also conceivable
that one under the domination of folly or of factional feeling or directed by a
perverted view of what he is doing, or even a wrong-headed conscience, may
do what would otherwise be traitorous acts, and yet not expose himself to the
charge because the acts, although carrying all the consequences of traitorous
acts, were done without traitorous purpose or intent. Such a man plays the
part of a traitor, but is not a traitor at heart.
Id. at 709-10 (dictum). Werner was not tried upon this indictment, however, but was
tried with others under an Espionage Act indictment. United States v. Shaefer, 251
U.S. 467 (1920).
73. 171 F.2d at 937-39.
74. 330 U.S. 631 (1946).
75. 171 F.2d at 940.
76. Id. at 942-44.
77. Id. at 943.
78. Id. at 945. Subsequently, the First Circuit similarly determined the question of
motive. See Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950).
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was in the best interest of the United States. Pryor, it appears, had the much
more limited and mundane motivation of self-preservation and possibly the
preservation of his fellow prisoners. Is it desirable, however, that the cases
be reconciled on this basis, that is to say, permitting motive to "take from
his conduct every possible imputation of disloyalty and disaffection to his
country" 79 where the defendant's motive is for private gain, but refusing to
let the defendant be "sheltered by his motives"80 when concern for h'is
country's ultimate welfare prompts his conduct? Surely Pryor would be as
likely as Chandler to know that the "natural and probable consequences"
of supplying a naval squadron with provisions is to "give aid and comfort"
to the enemy; whereas Chandler, except for his vanity, might be considered
not to have the same degree of certainty that his broadcasting efforts actually
were effective instruments of aid to the enemy cause.
Before examining the three Supreme Court decisions which appear to
illuminate this problem somewhat, it is appropriate to remark further upon
the general rule in ordinary criminal cases that motive is not a defense.8
Professor Wharton states:
[T]he will acts under a variety of motives, some very complex. The
motive varies with the man, what is strong with one being weak with
another .... And the law is, that no matter what may be the motives
leading to a particular act, if the act be illegal, it is indictable, not-
withstanding that some one or more of these motives may be merito-
rious. Thus the motive of promoting ultimate public good is no defense
to an indictment for nuisance; intending to instruct the public is
no defense to an indictment for libel; the motive of returning the
goods is no defense to an indictment for embezzlement; or for lar-
ceny; nor is the motive of giving away the goods to another; scientific
enthusiasm is no defense to an indictment for disinterring a corpse;
. . . no matter what motives, good or bad, cooperated, if the intent
to do the particular act is either proved or implied, the offense, if
committed, is complete. If the law were otherwise, there would be
few convictions of crime, for there are few crimes for which extra-
neous motives are not mixed up with a particular evil motive.
8 2
It may be said that, when dealing with intent, you are asking if the defendant
wants the particular prohibited result; and, when dealing with motive, the
question is why this prohibited result is desired.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never made as direct
a ruling upon the question of motive in treason cases as the First Circuit
79. United States v. Pryor, 27 Fed. Cas. 628, 630 (No. 16,096) (C.C.D. Pa. 1814).
80. Attorney Pinkney for the defendant in United States v. Hodges, 26 Fed. Cas.
332, 334 (No. 15,374) (C.C.D. Md. 1815).
81. CLARK & MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 20, § 5.00, at 234.
82. 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 155, at 208-10 (12th ed. 1951).
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has made in Chandler v. United States and in Best v. United States,8 3 some
expressions in three cases decided subsequent to Chandler and Best are of
value in speculating as to the Supreme Court's view if the question now
were brought before them.
Anthony Cramer, the defendant in Cramer v. United States,8 4 was a
naturalized American citizen of German origin. He was prosecuted for
treason resulting from his association with two of the German saboteurs
who in June, 1942, landed from enemy submarines with the mission of
disrupting industry in the United States.85 Although there was no evidence
to reflect that Cramer knew that the saboteurs were coming to this country,
he had been an intimate friend of one of the saboteurs, Werner Thiel, while
the latter lived in this country. When Thiel arrived in this country on his
sabotage mission, he left a "cryptic note" under Cramer's door in response
to which Cramer met Thiel at the Grand Central Station. Thereafter, as
charged in two overt acts, Cramer met Thiel and another saboteur named
Kerling on two different occasions at a tavern and at a cafeteria; and as a
third overt act, Cramer gave to agents from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, following the arrest of Thiel and Kerling, false information respecting
both the identity of Thiel and the reason for Thiel's assumption of a false
name. The evidence reflected that Cramer probably knew that Thiel and the
others had entered the United States illegally and had come upon a mission
for the German government, although he possibly did not know the exact
objective, namely, the sabotage of industrial plants.86 There was also evidence
that Cramer agreed to keep-and did keep--several thousand dollars for
Thiel which Thiel had in a money belt and which he indicated he secured in
Germany.87 Although there were two witnesses to each of the overt acts
charged, there were not two witnesses to the various facts which would estab-
lish the "incriminating character" of the first two overt acts, that is to say,
evidence that aid, and comfort were actually given to the enemy by reason of
the tavern meetings.88 The second sentence of the constitutional treason provi-
sion requires that "No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court."8 9
The Supreme Court reversed Cramer's conviction because of the failure
of the Government to establish by two witnesses the incriminating character
83. 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950) ; see note 78 supra and accompanying text.
84. 325 U.S. 1 (1944).
85. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
86. 325 U.S. at 5-6.
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id. at 37-38.
89. U.S. CONST. art III, § 3, ci. 1.
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of the two overt acts of the tavern meetings with Thiel and Kerling.9 ° The
majority opinion recognized, however, that "adherence to the enemy, in the
sense of a disloyal state of mind, cannot be, and is not required to be, proved
by deposition of two witnesses." 91 Mr. Justice Jackson wrote:
Since intent must be inferred from conduct of some sort, we think
it is permissible to draw usual reasonable inferences as to intent
from the overt acts. The law of treason, like the law of lesser crimes,
assumes every man to intend the natural consequences which one
standing in his circumstances and possessing his knowledge would
reasonably expect to result from his acts. Proof that a citizen did
give aid and comfort to an enemy may well be in the circumstances
sufficient evidence that he adhered to that enemy and that he in-
tended and purposed to strike at his own country.
9 2
There was a very strong dissent by four members of the court, with
Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for the minority. It is believed that Douglas
accurately stated the result of the majority holding:
The treasonable intent or purpose which it is said may be proved by
a single witness or circumstantial evidence must, in the absence of a
confession of guilt in open court, be inferred from all the facts and
circumstances which surround and relate to the overt act. Inference
of the treasonable purpose from events and acts related to or sur-
rounding the overt act necessarily includes the inference that the
accused committed the overt act with the knowledge or understand-
ing of its treasonable character.
93
Douglas, accordingly, said that requiring all of the evidence which gives an
incriminating character to an overt act to be established by the constitutional
two witnesses, and at the same time saying that the treasonable intent may be
proved by only a single witness is contradictory reasoning. 94 Although it is
conceivable that there might be proof of treasonable intent aside from the
proof of incriminating character of overt acts alleged, such proof would seem
under the Cramer decision to be merely corroborative in character.
The trial court in the Cramer case charged the jury that the
fact that his motive might not have been to aid the enemy is no
defense . . . . The fact that you may believe that his motive in so
doing was, for example, merely to help a friend, or possibly for
90. The Court did not consider the third overt act-the giving of false statements to
the FBI agents-because there had been a general verdict without special findings as to
the acts upon which it rested; therefore, it was "not possible to identify the grounds on
which Cramer was convicted . 325 U.S. at 36 n. 45.
91. Id. at 31.
92. Id. at 31-32.
93. Id. at 60. (Emphasis added.)
94. Ibid.
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financial gain, would not change the fact that he had a criminal
intent.9 5
Mr. Justice Douglas, for the minority, stated that "On that there apparently
is no disagreement." 96 He wrote: "A man who voluntarily assists one known
or believed to be an enemy agent may not defend on the ground that he
betrayed his country for only thirty pieces of silver." 97 Yet, it would appear
that, although this point was not expressly discussed, it was the possibility
that Cramer's motives in meeting and conferring with Thiel and Kerling were
acts of friendship only which resulted in the Supreme Court's majority
requirement that this possibility be negatived by incriminating evidence offered
by two witnesses. If, for example, the overt acts had been treasonable on their
face, as for example, standing in the ranks of an enemy military detachment
and taking the oath of allegiance, there would have been no occasion to require
additional two-witness evidence of the incriminating character of the overt act.
The majority opinion expressly stated:
[T]o make treason the defendant not only must intend the act, but
he must intend to betray his country by means of the act. It is here
that Cramer defends. The issue is joined between conflicting theories
as to how this treacherous intention and treasonable purpose must
be made to appear. 98
This admittedly tortuous analysis of the Cramer case in terms of its
illumination of the motive problem nonetheless appears justified in the light
of Haupt v. United States.99 Herbert Haupt was another one of the German
saboteurs who came to this country in a submarine. His father, Hans Max
Haupt, the defendant in Haupt, was a naturalized citizen of the United States.
After Herbert arrived in the United States, he went to Chicago where his
father lived. Herbert was given shelter by his father, alleged as one overt act,
was aided by his father in obtaining re-employment with the Simpson Optical
Company which manufactured lenses for Norden bombsights, alleged as a
second overt act, and was aided by his father in the purchase of an automobile,
alleged as a third overt act.
Haupt's conviction was affirmed with Mr. Justice Jackson again deliver-
ing the majority opinion. Jackson distinguished the Cramer case, stating that
in the Haupt case the overt acts were treasonable on their face, that is to say,
on their face they were understood to constitute "giving aid and comfort" to
the enemy. 100
95. Id. at 54-55.
96. Id. at 54.
97. Id. at 55.
98. Id. at 31.
99. 330 U.S. 631 (1946).
100. Id. at 635-36.
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The defendant maintained that the conviction should not be sustained
because the acts of aid and comfort being natural acts to aid his own son, there
was not sufficient proof of adherence to the enemy. Jackson observed that the
relationship is a fact for the jury to weigh along with others, and they
were correctly instructed that if they found that defendant's intention
was not to injure the United States but merely to aid his son as an
individual, as distinguished from assisting him in his purposes, if such
existed, of aiding the German Reich, or of injuring the United States,
the defendant must be found not guilty. 0 1
Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting, was of the view that at least the act of
sheltering defendant's son was not treasonable on its face and that under the
Cramer case testimony by two witnesses to such acts as would give it a
treasonable character would be required and was in fact lacking; therefore,
Mr. Justice Murphy was of the opinion that the case should be reversed.
10 2
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in affirming the conviction, stating that he
likewise believed that the act of sheltering was "wholly innocent on its face,"
but its incriminating nature should not have to be proved by two witnesses-
the same position that he took in his dissent in the Cramer case.1
0 3
The latest expression by the Supreme Court bearing any relationship to
the question of motive in treason cases is in Kawakita v. United States.
10 4
The Supreme Court in this case affirmed the conviction of an American
citizen, who also was a Japanese citizen and who had obtained employment
during World War II with a Japanese private corporation where he mal-
treated American prisoners of war employed there. The majority opinion in
the Kawakita case held that defendant's acts of mistreating the American
prisoners of war had as their natural and probable consequences the increase
of munitions production and that accordingly these acts gave aid and comfort
to the enemy. 10 5 A substantial part of the case involved questions of dual
citizenship, but the defendant also contended that he was "coerced" by his
employer to perform the acts which were the basis of the charges against him.
Mr. Justice Douglas, who this time wrote the majority opinion, stated that if
those acts were "done under the compulsion of the job or the law or some
other influence, those acts would not rise to the gravity" of treason. 10 6 Douglas
101. Id. at 641.
102. Id. at 646-49.
103. Id. at 644-46.
104. 343 U.S. 717 (1951).
105. Id. at 738-39.
106. Surely this view relates to the question of motive and not to that of coercion as
Mr. Justice Douglas' language would superficially seem to suggest. It will be recalled
that Mr. Justice Duval in the Hodges case said that only a threat to the defendant's life
would excuse a treasonable act. 26 Fed. Cas. at 334. The general rule is that
a person who joins with others in a rebellion or other treasonable acts is not
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observed that the trial court had instructed the jury to acquit the defendant
if his acts were performed as the result of "the duties of his employment" or
"because of other-coercion or compulsion."'1 7 While this expression appears
to be dictum, it does seem to support the conclusion that the Supreme Court
would be sympathetic toward the justification of nontreasonable motive,
at least where this motive relates to private purposes. In this connection it will
be recalled that earlier the First Circuit in Chandler also had suggested
exculpation might lie where the otherwise treasonable conduct proceeded
from a requirement of employment within the enemy territory. 0
It is reasonable to suppose on the strength of inferences drawn from
Cramer, Haupt, and Kawakita that the Supreme Court would favor Mr.
Justice Washington's views in the Pryor case rather than those of Mr. Justice
Duval in Hodges. Proof of private motivation would negative the element of
treasonable intent.
PROOF OF MENTAL QUALITY OF OVERT ACT
Returning to Cramer, the licensing of the defense of good private motives
was not the most drastic limitation attaching to treason prosecutions as the
result of that case. The crippling holding was the requirement that where the
overt act relied upon is not treasonable upon its face, its treasonable character
must be proven by two witnesses. The inevitable result of this requirement
would seem to be that two witnesses are necessary to the treasonable intent
as well as to the overt act. This requirement virtually eliminates all prosecu-
tions except for the most public treasons. Mr. Justice Douglas went so far as
to say that "Such a result makes the way easy for the traitor, does violence
to the Constitution and makes justice truly blind."' 0 9 It is interesting to
observe that the only treason prosecutions initiated by the Government sub-
criminally responsible therefor, if, during the whole time he is with them, he is
compelled to remain and take part by threats of death or great bodily harm....
[T]he threatened injury must be present and impending. And the only threats
which will be sufficient to make out a case of compulsion are threats of injury to
the person.
CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES § 5.16, at 325-27 (6th ed. 1958). Futhermore, the case of
D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951) made a clear application of this
general rule to treason cases in directly approving the trial court's instructions on coer-
cion and duress, saying-
We think that the citizen owing allegiance to the United States must manifest
a determination to resist commands and orders until such time as he is faced with
the alternative of immediate injury or death. Were any other rule to be applied,
traitors in the enemy country would by that fact alone be shielded from any
requirement of resistance. The person claiming the defense of coercion and duress
must be a person whose resistance has brought him to the last ditch.
Id. at 359.
107. 343 U.S. at 735.
108. 171 F.2d at 925.
109. 325 U.S. at 68.
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sequent to Cramer, decided in the October 1944 Term were cases of "public
treason"-either propaganda broadcasts or mistreatment of prisoners of
war.
110
TREASON UNDER "OTHER NAMES"
The majority in Cramer recognized that its holding was a restrictive one,
making treason hard to prove; but the Court wrote:
[T]he treason offense is not the only nor can it well serve as a
principal legal weapon to vindicate our national cohesion and security.
In debating this provision, Rufus King observed to the Convention
that the "controversy relating to Treason might be of less magnitude
than was supposed; as the legislature might punish capitally under
other names than treason." His statement holds good today. Of
course, we do not intimate that congress could dispense with the two-
witness rule merely by giving the same offense another name."'
The Congress has indeed enacted many penal statutes designed to protect
the security of the federal government. Among them would be the act punish-
110. These were: (1) Ezra Pound whose indictment on November 26, 1945, for his
broadcasting activities on behalf of the Italian government during World War II
resulted in a dismissed indictment following his commitment to St. Elizabeth Hospital as
being of unsound mind and incapable of standing trial; (2) Douglas Chandler who was
convicted on June 28, 1947, of treason as a result of broadcasting enemy propaganda during
World War II over Radio Berlin, and his conviction affirmed in Chandler v. United
States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1948) ; (3) Robert H. Best
who was convicted April 16, 1948, because of his broadcasting activities over Radio
Berlin, and his conviction affirmed in Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1950) ; (4) Tomova Kawakita whose treason conviction was based
upon maltreatment of American prisoners of war, and his conviction affirmed in Kawakita
v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1951) ; (5) Martin James Monti who pleaded guilty and
confessed in open court to the treason charges against him, which included a propaganda
broadcast over the German radio; (6) Herbert John Burgman who was convicted
November 15, 1949, of treason charges based on broadcasting from Berlin, and his
conviction affirmed in Burgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 838 (1951) ; (7) Mildred Elizabeth "Axis Sally" Gillars who was convicted on
March 10, 1949 of treason based upon propaganda broadcasts during World War II,
and her conviction affirmed in Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; (8)
Iva Toquri "Tokyo Rose" D'Aquino who was convicted September 29, 1949, because of
her broadcasting activities over Radio Tokyo during World War II, and her conviction
affirmed in D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
935 (1951) ; (9) David Provoo who was convicted upon the overt treasonable acts of
serving the Japanese as an informer while a prisoner of war, which resulted in an
American officer's execution, and of participating in propaganda broadcasts, and his
conviction reversed in United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954) with further
prosecution inhibited as a result of the dismissal of a subsequent indictment in United
States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) on the grounds
that he had been denied a speedy trial. Letter from J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney
General, to Joel W. Westbrook, Sept. 9, 1963. The Haupt case was in the course of
appeal at the time of the Cramer decision.
Ill. 325 U.S. at 45.
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ing rebellion or insurrection, 12 the act punishing seditious conspiracy, 13 the
Trading with the Enemy Act," 4 and the Espionage Act.1 5 Could any of these
statutes be invalid either by its terms or in a particular application on the basis
that the conduct prohibited by the statute must be governed by the constitu-
tional treason provision? There has been no such holding by a federal appel-
late court. While there have indeed been but limited occasions upon which
judicial review of this question has been sought, there has been enough
judicial discussion to warrant the suspicion at least that serious problems of
this nature could develop.
Probably Wimmer v. United States"6 is the only modern federal appel-
late decision which provides any actual discussion of the question." 7 The
defendant in that case was convicted of a violation of the Espionage Act of
1917 providing: "[Whoever shall by word or act support or favor the cause
of any country with which the United States is at war or by word or act
oppose the cause of the United States therein, shall be punished ".... I" The
alleged conduct which was the basis for violation of the law was Wimmer's
series of statements concerning America's chances of winning the war,
President Wilson's reasons for "starting" the war, and the President's favorit-
ism for the "rich" while the Kaiser was "a friend of the poor man."" 9 The
112. 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (1958).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (1958).
114. 40 Stat. 411 (1917), 50 app. U.S.C. § 3(a) (1958).
115. 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-99, 2388 (1958).
116. 264 Fed. 11 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 253 U.S. 494 (1920). Contemporaneous cases
in the Sixth Circuit citing Wimmer were Schoborg v. United States, 264 Fed. 1 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 494 (1920) and Lockhart v. United States, 264 Fed. 14
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 645 (1920).
117. Over a hundred years before, the Supreme Court had touched on the question
in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
Crimes so atrocious as those which have for their object the subversion by
violence of those laws and those institutions which have been ordained in order
to secure the peace and happiness of society, are not to escape punishment
because they have not ripened into treason. The wisdom of the legislature is
competent to provide for the case; and the framers of our constitution, who not
only defined and limited the crime, but with jealous circumspection attempted to
protect their limitation by providing that no person should be convicted of it,
unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession
in open court, must have conceived it more safe that punishment in such cases
should be ordained by general laws, formed upon deliberation, under the influence
of no resentments, and without knowing on whom they were to operate, than
that it should be inflicted under the influence of those passions which the occasion
seldom fails to excite, and which a flexible definition of the crime, or a construc-
tion which would render it flexible, might bring into operation. It is, therefore,
more safe as well as more consonant to the principles of our constitution, that
the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases;
and that crimes not clearly within the constitutional definition, should receive
such punishment as the legislature in its wisdom may pr'ovide.
Id. at 126-27.
118. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, as amended, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (now 18
U.S.C. § 2388 (1958) ).
119. 264 Fed. at 12.
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trial court submitted the case to the jury under instructions which would
require them to acquit the defendant unless they found that Wimmer had
made these statements with the deliberate intention of supporting and favoring
the enemy or opposing the cause of the United States and realized these
statements were likely to produce that effect.
Wimmer's first position in the court of appeals was that the act was
unconstitutional because "it punishes treasonable conduct, without proof of
the overt act and without the two witnesses thereto required by the Constitu-
tion. '1 20 The court disposed of this contention 12 1 by stating that the Supreme
Court had "summarily overruled" a similar argument in Frohwerk v. United
States.122 Actually, the court's position was not well-founded because aside
from the fact that the Frohwerk case was before the Supreme Court without
any bill of exceptions, Frohwerk's contention differed substantially from that
advanced by Wimmer. Frohwerk contended that his conduct was not trea-
sonable, and that the Espionage Act of 1917 provided for the punishment
of acts which were treasonous; therefore his conduct could not be punished
under the act. The court said that this suggestion needs "no more than to be
stated."'1 23 Wimmer's position, however, was that his conduct could only be
punished as treason.
To overcome this contention the Sixth Circuit held that Wimmer's
conduct was not treason.
If we had to deal with the case where the conduct which was pros-
ecuted consisted of acts, we would have to consider the line of
reasoning upon which Wimmer depends. That Congress has power
to take hold of an act which is, in fact, treason, and to say that it
shall be severely punished, without the proof which is required to
establish treason, and to justify this result because the conduct is
given another name, is a proposition which we have no occasion to
affirm or deny. Here the only conduct alleged or proved, as making
out the offense, consisted of oral statements,-words only. It is well
settled that one cannot by mere words, be guilty of treason . . .and
thus the fallacy of Wimmer's contention becomes apparent.
1 24
The court, however, while agreeing that in all probability the words "favor or
support" as used in the act amounted to "adhering," stated that these words
did not carry with them the idea of giving aid and comfort. "Hence it may




121. Ibid. Accord, Equi v. United States, 261 Fed. 53 (9th Cir. 1919).
122. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
123. Id. at 210.
124. 264 Fed. at 12-13.
125. Id. at 13.
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Schenck v. United States12 6 (decided a week before Frohwerk with
Mr. Justice Holmes writing the opinions in both cases) should have been
considered before assuming that words which did not give aid and comfort
would be sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Espionage Act. In the
Schenck case Mr. Justice Holmes dealt with the contention that the publica-
tions there in question were protected by the first amendment, using his
famous declaration that "the most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater, and in causing a
panic.' 2 7 He also wrote:
[T]he question in every case was whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no court could
regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
128
Would not words which "constitute a clear and present danger" so as to
hinder a war effort clearly amount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy?
This question has not remained abstract, having been answered by the Chandler
and Best cases in the First Circuit and by Gillars v. United States12 9 in the
District of Columbia Circuit. In these three cases the question was raised as
to whether or not the crime of treason could be committed by the mere
expressions of opinion or criticism, which were the substance of the propa-
ganda broadcasts of the defendants. 30 In the Chandler case Chief Judge
Magruder wrote:
[T]he mere utterance of disloyal sentiments is not treason; aid and
comfort must be given to the enemy. But the communication of an
idea, whether by speech or writing, is as much an act as is throwing
a brick, though different muscles are used to achieve different effects.
One may commit treason by conveying military intelligence to the
enemy, though the only overt act is the speaking of words. Other
cases may readily be imagined where the speaking of words might
constitute treason. . . . The significant thing is not so much the
character of the act which in fact gives aid and comfort to the enemy,
but whether the act is done with an intent to betray.1"1
126. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
127. Id. at 52.
128. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
129. 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
130. See also D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 935 (1951) ; Burgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 838 (1951).
131. 171 F.2d at 938.
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Magruder also believed that a scientist solicited by an enemy agent could be
convicted of treason for deliberately expressing erroneous scientific opinions
in order to lead a vital war project "down a blind alley" because these pur-
ported scientific opinions would give aid to the agent "in steps essential to the
consummation of his hostile mission.'
U 32
Accordingly, if a similar question were presented today, it is believed
that a prosecutor could have no substantial confidence that a statute punishing
statements in time of war favoring the enemy or opposing the United States,
without requiring the proof of an overt act by two witnesses, would not be
held invalid either by its terms or through application. Consider the act making
it an offense to procure "the escape of any prisoner of war held by the United
States . . . knowing him to be such prisoner of war . . ,,133 Although the
authors of this legislation attached the thoughtful proviso that "this section
shall be in addition to and not in substitution for any other provision of
law,' x34 surely a conviction under this statute would have doubtful endurance
unless possibly the conviction was of someone not owing allegiance to the
United States. This situation is somewhat difficult to visualize because aliens
domiciled in the United States in time of war do owe allegiance to the United
States and because an alien domiciled outside of the United States would not
be subject to the jurisdiction of this statute anyway.'
3 5
Since "peacetime treason" consists only of "levying War,"' 36 it might be
expected that our statutes protecting the security of the government against
peacetime subversion would be less vulnerable to the contention that they were
unconstitutionally extending the law of treason; yet, consider the possibility
that there could be called into question the act which punishes "Whoever
incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against
the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort
thereto .... ,us7 Of course, in order to come within the constitutional con-
templation of "levying War," it is necessary that there be an "assemblage of
armed men" ;138 therefore, where an indictment under this statute substantially
alleges an assemblage of armed men for the purpose of preventing totally the
execution of any law,'1 39 it at least would appear that the defendant could
132. Ibid.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 757 (1958).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 757 (1958).
135. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1951).
136. United States v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. Cas. 18 (No. 15,524) (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1863).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (1958).
138. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
139. See United States v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. Cas. 18 (No. 15,524), (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1863) ; United States v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. 105 (No. 15,299) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) ;
United States v. Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826 (No. 15,126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) ; United States
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make out a good case for requiring that overt acts for the effectuation of that
purpose be identified and that such overt acts be proven by two witnesses. It
would be comforting to believe that the nation faces no serious prospect of
armed assemblages resisting the total execution of any laws, but the matching
of the constitutional treason clause against the enforcement of such statutes
could become a reality.
Note should be taken of the opinion that court-martial enforcement of
article 104 of the Code of Military Justice, which prohibits the knowing
correspondence with the enemy without authority, also is inhibited by the
constitutional treason clause. 140 Judge Goodman in Martin v. Young 141 gave
some basis for this belief when he released, after a habeas corpus hearing, a
soldier being held by the Army to answer an article 104 charge for conduct
allegedly committed before his honorable discharge.
In United States v. Batchelor,142 however, the United States Court of
Military Appeals held that a specific intent to betray was not an element of
article 104 and rejected any possible contrary inference from Martin v. Young.
Interestingly enough, the United States Court of Military Appeals supported
its view with Chandler-a treason case.
CONCLUSION
By reason of judicial interpretations of the mental quality inherent in
the law of treason, there is substantial doubt of the efficacy of the treason
statute143 to provide for the security of the Government. Also, the constitu-
tional treason clause might well provide shelter for defendants prosecuted
under other security statutes, especially statutes designed to punish verbal
adherence to the enemy in a war-setting and statutes directed against peace-
time armed insurrections. These concerns in the largest sense might be con-
sistent with the deliberately restrictive policies of the framers of the Constitu-
tion;144 nonetheless, a prudent regard for legally effective state security
measures should inspire a continuing review of our paratreason penal statutes
and meticulous drafting of indictments based upon them.
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